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(Mis)appropriation Art: Transformation and Attribution in the Fair 
Use Doctrine 




 Since the adoption of transformation by the Supreme Court, judicial 
decisions have continued to expand the fair use doctrine. Relying on 
transformation has led judges to subjectively critique and analyze artwork 
in order to make a legal decision. However, while a majority of circuits apply 
transformation, it is not followed by all of them. Transformation should no 
longer be a requirement in a fair use analysis concerning appropriation art, 
because it first requires subjective interpretation of an artist’s work. 
Transformation also gives an advantage to artists appropriating the work, 
claiming fair use of another’s copyrighted work. Instead, the emphasis 
should be on the overall effect on the market for the original work by the 
secondary use, with special consideration given to how attribution to the 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
You are invited to attend the new exhibit of a well-known artist at one 
of the most famous galleries in New York City. Weaving your way through 
celebrities and critics, you notice a piece that looks very familiar. Upon 
closer inspection, you realize the artist has based the work on a photograph 
you took several years ago, but the photo has been slightly manipulated. 
Your name is not mentioned anywhere, and you never gave the artist 
permission to use your work. Frustrated with what you consider 
an objectionable use, you want to prevent the artist from further exploiting 
your creative work.1 However, after consulting with copyright counsel, you 
learn that your ability to vindicate your rights under federal copyright law 
depends on where you file a lawsuit. As interpreted in the Second and Ninth 
Circuits, the fair use doctrine may allow the artist to easily convince a judge 
that the copying was necessary for his or her own creative vision, and you 
may be left without a remedy. 
Fair use is an affirmative defense, allowing the use of a copyrighted 
work to not constitute infringement.2 When analyzing a fair use defense, 
courts must look to four statutory factors to determine whether the 
defendant’s taking of the copyright holder’s work qualifies as a fair use: 1) 
the purpose and character of the use; 2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.3 
 
 1.  While the aforementioned is meant to be a hypothetical example, it is comparable to the events 
surrounding Richard Prince’s New Portraits exhibit. Prince commented on others’ Instagram pictures, 
took screenshots of them, and placed them on canvas. New Portraits was featured at the Gagosian Gallery 
in New York City in September and October of 2014. GAGOSIAN GALLERY, 
http://www.gagosian.com/exhibitions/richard-prince—september-19-2014. Since then, the works have 
sold for upwards of $90,000 per piece. Jessica Contrera, A Reminder That Your Instagram Photos Aren’t 
Really Yours: Someone Else Can Sell Them for $90,000, THE WASHINGTON POST (May 25, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/style-blog/wp/2015/05/25/a-reminder-that-your-instagram-
photos-arent-really-yours-someone-else-can-sell-them-for-90000/. Donald Graham, a photographer, 
learned one of his photos was used in the exhibit and sent Prince and the Gagosian Gallery cease and 
desist letters. Hrag Vartanian, Photographer Sends Cease and Desist Letters to Richard Prince and 
Gagosian, HYPERALLERGIC (Feb. 15, 2015), http://hyperallergic.com/183036/photographer-sends-cease-
and-desist-letters-to-richard-prince-and-gagosian/. Donald Graham’s Rastafarian Smoking a Joint, 
Jamaica was uploaded to Instagram by a third party and Prince used the photo as the basis of one of his 
New Portraits without permission or attributing Graham. Id. Graham has since filed suit against Prince 
and the Gagosian claiming copyright infringement. Eileen Kinsella, Outraged Photographer Sues 
Gagosian Gallery and Richard Prince for Copyright Infringement (Jan. 4, 2016), 
https://news.artnet.com/market/donald-graham-sues-gagosian-richard-prince-401498. Prince could 
potentially face several additional actions for his use of copyrighted images in New Portraits. 
 2.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 3.  Id. 
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Twenty years ago, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Supreme 
Court clarified the “purpose and character of the use” factor, stating that 
courts should determine if the new work is “transformative” of the original 
work.4 The Court held that judges should look to whether the new work adds 
something to the first work, or alters it with a new meaning or message.5 
Such a task requires judges to subjectively interpret the meaning of both 
works at issue. If a court determines the new work is transformative, that 
would weigh heavily in favor of fair use. 
This precedent has been interpreted differently among the circuits, and 
has led to much confusion. Specifically, in the world of appropriation art, the 
focus on transformation requires judges to rely on their personal views on 
art to determine if and how a work has been sufficiently transformed into a 
new work. As a result, many plaintiffs rely on judges who likely do not have 
substantial training in the fine arts. Additionally, it is counter to the words 
penned by Justice Holmes over a century ago: “It would be a dangerous 
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final 
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and 
most obvious limits.”6 As a result of the transformation test, judges are 
forced to ignore this warning when deciding art appropriation cases. 
Appropriation artists use others’ work to create their own works. The 
prior works can be in the public domain, or protected under copyright law. 
Appropriation artists often take another’s material, and manipulate it by 
changing color, size, and orientation7 or may simply enlarge the size of an 
existing photograph.8 Only some of these early artists were consciously 
aware of the legal recourse they might face.9 
 
 4.  510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
 7.  See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) (creating the work “Niagara” by using 
a photograph from a high fashion magazine and “includ[ing] in the painting only the legs and feet from 
the photograph but “invert[ing] . . . the orientation of the legs so that they dangle vertically downward 
above the other elements of ‘Niagara’ rather than slant upward at a 45-degree angle as they appear in the 
photograph” and “add[ing] a heel to one of the feet and modify[ing] the photograph’s coloring”). 
 8.  See, e.g., Richard Prince, Untitled (Cowboy), 1980. 
 9.  Laura Gilbert, Comment, No Longer Appropriate?, THE ART NEWSPAPER, 235 (May 2012), 
http://old.theartnewspaper.com/articles/No%20longer%20appropriate?/26378 (last visited March 28, 
2015). A pioneer of appropriation art, Sherry Levine, stated, “She made it clear that piracy, with its 
overtones of infringement and lack of authorisation, was the point.” Id. 
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One of the most popular appropriation artists is Jeff Koons.10 His works 
are widely known, and include pieces such as an inflatable Incredible Hulk,11 
a giant stainless steel Popeye,12 and paintings using images from famous 
magazines.13 While Koons has held exhibitions all over the world and gained 
significant popularity, his success has not allowed him to avoid major 
copyright litigation.14 In one such dispute, a French advertisement designer 
named Franck Davidovici claimed that Koons’ sculpture, Fait d’Hiver, 
1988,15 was a copy of the photograph and advertisement he created for the 
clothing company Naf Naf.16 
The advertisement, entitled Fait d’Hiver, was created in 1985 and 
featured a woman laying on her back with a pig at the top of her head, 
sporting a rum barrel around its neck.17 Koons created four identical 
sculptures in 1988, each depicting a woman laying on her back with a pig at 
the top of her head.18 However, Koons’ sculptures differ from Davidovici’s 
advertisement in that they include a penguin and its chick and depicts the pig 
wearing a lei with the rum barrel and the woman wearing a mesh top that 
exposes her breasts.19 Davidovici’s lawyer confirmed that legal action was 
 
 10.  Jeff Koons was born in Pennsylvania in 1955, studied at the Maryland Institute College of Art 
and received a BFA in 1976. His artwork has been featured in galleries and institutions around the world, 
including the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, the Neue National Galerie in Berlin, and the 
Pompidou Center in Paris. Biography, JEFF KOONS, http://jeffkoons.com/biography-summary (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2015). 
 11.  Artwork, JEFF KOONS, http://jeffkoons.com/artwork/hulk-elvis/hulk-friends (last visited April 
28, 2015). 
 12.  Artwork, JEFF KOONS, http://jeffkoons.com/artwork/popeye/popeye-0 (last visited Jan. 2, 
2015). 
 13.  Artwork, JEFF KOONS, http://jeffkoons.com/artwork/easyfun-ethereal/niagara (last visited April 
28, 2015). 
 14.  See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 
1992); United Features Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 15.  See infra Figure 2. 
 16.  Alexander Forbes, Jeff Koons Sued for Plagiarism, ARTNET NEWS (Dec. 18, 2014), 
http://news.artnet.com/market/jeff-koons-sued-for-plagiarism-201510 (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
Davidocivi’s lawyer confirmed that “a ‘legal action’ was underway” but did not specify the nature of the 
action. Id. A case filing has not been locatable. A similar case has been filed in the United States. See 
Henri Neuendorf, Jeff Koons Sued Yet Again Over Copyright Infringement (December 15, 2015), 
https://news.artnet.com/art-world/jeff-koons-sued-copyright-infringement-392667 (last visited Jan. 14, 
2016). A photographer claims his photograph, which was used in a 1986 advertisement, was used as the 
basis for a work by Jeff Koons. Id. This Note does not explore this case. 
 17.  See infra Figure 2. 
 18.  Forbes, supra note 16. 
 19.  Id. 
6 ZWISLER - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/16  3:02 PM 
2016] (MIS)APPROPRIATION ART 167 
underway in France, even though the sculpture was removed from display at 
the Centre Pompidou in Paris at the request of its owners.20 
In past litigation, when facing a copyright infringement claim, Koons 
asserted the fair use defense.21 Although Koons prevailed in only one of these 
cases,22 a more recent decision coming from the Second Circuit has expanded 
the breadth of fair use.23 This could lead to an increased likelihood of 
successful assertions of the fair use defense for Koons and other 
appropriation artists, because the court in Cariou v. Prince held that artists 
do not need to explain the meaning of the work they create,24 thus easing the 
burden of proof for an appropriation artist. 
In Cariou v. Prince, another well-known appropriation artist, Richard 
Prince, was able to partially avoid liability for copyright infringement by 
asserting a fair use defense.25 In that case, the Second Circuit held that a new 
work need not comment on the original work to be considered fair use.26 
Therefore, the transformative nature of Prince’s work alone was sufficient 
for twenty-five of the thirty challenged works to be deemed fair use.27 This 
expansion of the transformative test further muddied the already confusing 
test the Supreme Court adopted just over twenty years ago. 
In the landmark case Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the rap group 
2 Live Crew was accused of copying Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman” in 
the creation of their song “Pretty Woman.”28 2 Live Crew argued that despite 
the commercial nature of the song, it was a parody, and should be considered 
fair use.29 The Court dismissed the notion that the commercial nature of a 
new work alone was per se infringement, and clarified the fair use analysis 
by stating that transformation occurs when the new work “adds something 
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message.”30 It also heavily focused on the 
 
 20.  Alexander Forbes, Jeff Koons Plagiarism Lawsuit Could Top Millions, ARTNET NEWS (January 
19, 2015), http://news.artnet.com/market/jeff-koons-plagiarism-lawsuit-could-top-millions-225200 (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
 21.  Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 2006); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d 
Cir. 1992); United Features Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 22.  See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 259. 
 23.  See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 24.  Id. at 698. 
 25.  Id. at 698–99. 
 26.  Id. at 698. 
 27.  Id. at 698–99. 
 28.  510 U.S. 572, 572 (1994). 
 29.  Id. at 574. 
 30.  Id. at 574. 
 30.  Id. at 579, 583. 
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transformative nature of the potentially infringing work, and stated that “the 
more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other 
factors.”31 
In Cariou, the Second Circuit expanded “the purpose and character of 
the use” factor and granted a major victory for appropriation artists. 
However, the rationale the court used has not been adopted across all the 
circuits, because the Seventh and Ninth Circuits interpret the four statutory 
factors in the context of appropriation art differently.32 Since the Campbell 
decision, the lower courts have struggled to determine what exactly makes a 
work transformative. As a result, judges act as art critics and add their 
subjective interpretation to the meaning of the copyrighted work and 
potentially infringing work, which the Supreme Court cautioned against over 
a century ago.33 
The Supreme Court in Campbell erred in adopting the transformative 
test, because it led to widespread subjective interpretation of art among the 
lower courts and major uncertainty in fair use cases. Doing away with the 
transformative test and shifting the focus back to the other statutory factors, 
with an emphasis on the fourth factor—the effect the taking had on the 
potential market of the original work—will remove the mandate that judges 
make subjective interpretations of artistic works. Additionally, an 
appropriation artist who attributes his or her reliance on a copyrighted work 
to the original artist should be able to argue that the positive effect on the 
market for the original was, in part, due to the attention the appropriation 
artist brought to the original artist’s work. Focusing on the fourth statutory 
factor will also allow plaintiffs to bring infringement actions without fear of 
a subjective judicial decision and allow appropriation artists to make more 
compelling arguments when considering market effect. 
This Note will use Davidovici v. Koons34 to explain the fair use doctrine 
and will illustrate the circuit split regarding that theory. This Note will also 
explain the problems with the transformative test and will provide a solution 
that will increase consistency among appropriation art cases. Part II will then 
discuss a history of the fair use defense, tracing its origins from a focus on 
supplanting the market of the original work to where it lies today. Part II will 
also explain how transformation currently usurps the four statutory factors. 
 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  See Kieintz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014); Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 
725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 33.  See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
 34.  Forbes, supra note 16. While a filing regarding this dispute has not been locatable, this Note 
will refer to the dispute as Davidocivi v. Koons. 
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Part III will then describe appropriation art and its case history and will 
illustrate the wide variety of arguments that artists can make under the 
expanded fair use test. Part IV will address how different courts would 
analyze and decide Davidovici v. Koons, based on the respective tests each 
circuit employs. By doing so, this Note illustrates the circuit split and will 
show how artists do not enjoy uniform relief among federal circuits. Part V 
will then provide a solution to the fair use problem—eliminating the 
transformative test and replacing it with a more straightforward statutory 
interpretation by focusing on the fourth factor. Additionally, Part V will 
consider how attribution to the original copyright owner might influence the 
fair use analysis. Finally, Part VI will conclude with asking the Supreme 
Court to eliminate the circuit split by instructing lower courts regarding 
proper fair use analysis. 
II.  A HISTORY OF FAIR USE 
A.  Supplanting the Market of the Original Work 
The common law doctrine of fair use did not develop from judges 
interpreting the works at issue, but rather focused on whether the new work 
would act as a substitute in the market for the original work. The first 
example of the fair use doctrine involved a dispute between a biography 
entitled Life of Washington and a previously published encyclopedia, both 
based on the writings of President George Washington.35 Justice Story wrote 
that when the original and allegedly infringing works are compared, the court 
should answer the question of copying by relying on a 
nice balance of the comparative use made in one of the materials of the 
other; the nature, extent, and value of the materials thus used; the objects 
of each work; and the degree to which each writer may be fairly presumed 
to have resorted to the same common sources of information.36 
The court’s primary concern was that the new work would prove to be a 
replacement for the original and that “[i]f so much is taken that, the value of 
the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are 
substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient, 
in point of law, to constitute a piracy pro tanto.”37 Utilizing this framework, 
the court found the biography infringed the encyclopedia38 and laid the basic 
underpinnings of what the fair use doctrine would later become. 
 
 35.  Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
 36.  Id. at 344. 
 37.  Id. at 348. 
 38.  Id. at 349. 
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B.  The Codification of Fair Use 
Congress codified a version of the fair use doctrine in the 1976 
Copyright Act.39 The Act established fair use as an affirmative defense to a 
claim of copyright infringement, and lists several purposes in which fair use 
can be used as a defense. The fair use defense could be used for the following 
types of works: criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, 
or research.40 In addition, the statute included four factors that need to be 
balanced in a fair use analysis: (1) the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit 
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted works as 
a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work.41 
Congress intended each factor to weigh equally in the fair use analysis, 
and that each case needed to be decided upon its own set of facts.42 While no 
factor was meant to be dispositive, courts heavily focused on the fourth 
factor before 1994, to the point that the Supreme Court called it  
“undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”43 Fair use 
jurisprudence would retain this bias toward the fourth factor until the rise of 
the transformation sub-factor. 
C.  Toward a Fair Use Standard and the Rise of Transformation 
Considering the prevalence of the transformation consideration in the 
modern fair use analysis, its presence is conspicuously absent from the 1976 
Copyright Act. Therefore, its rise can be partially attributed to an influential 
law review article penned by Judge Pierre Leval, which changed the way the 
fair use doctrine is applied.44 In Toward a Fair Use Standard, Judge Leval 
 
 39.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  17 U.S.C. § 107(1)–(4) (2012). 
 42.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976) (finding that because circumstances in copyright cases 
can be so diverse, bright line rules are not as helpful as case-by-case analysis); see also Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (stating that all four statutory factors “are to be explored, 
and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright”). 
 43.  Harper & Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
 44.  Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, The Jurisprudence of Transformation: Intellectual 
Incoherence and Doctrinal Murkiness Twenty Years After Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music. 12 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 92, 99–101 (2014) (“While the [Supreme] Court did not accept transformative use as 
necessary to a fair use . . . it was nonetheless regarded as highly auspicious in the new analytical scheme 
Campbell created. . . . Despite its legal murkiness, the transformative use doctrine gradually became 
central to fair use determination in many lower courts.”) (emphasis in original). 
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argued for a shift away from the contemporary application of the fair use 
statute, and towards a focus on whether the allegedly infringing work is 
transformative.45 Judge Leval suggested that the purpose of fair use is to 
comply with the main objective of copyright protection: to stimulate the 
production of creative works to benefit society.46 In order to achieve this 
objective, Judge Leval posited that courts should determine whether the new 
work is transformative of the original work by adding a different character 
with a new expression, meaning, or message.47 Judge Leval believed that 
transformative works would further the underpinnings of copyright law, as 
well as the copyright clause of the Constitution.48 However, Judge Leval was 
concerned that extensive borrowings would prohibit creative incentives.49 
Therefore, the justification for the appropriation could be outweighed “if the 
takings are excessive and other factors favor the copyright owner.”50 Despite 
the caution from Judge Leval, the Campbell court endorsed the 
transformation consideration and allowed it to eventually dominate the fair 
use test. 
D.  The Supreme Court Errs in Expanding Fair Use 
In 1989, Luther Campbell of the rap group 2 Live Crew wrote the song 
“Pretty Woman,” a parody of Roy Orbison’s famed “Oh, Pretty Woman.”51 
The parody heavily drew from Orbison’s work, and when faced with a claim 
of copyright infringement, 2 Live Crew argued a fair use defense.52 The case 
is important for a variety of reasons, the most notable of which was the 
emphasis the Supreme Court chose to place on Judge Leval’s article.53 While 
the Court stated that a finding of transformative use is not absolutely 
necessary for a finding of fair use, it also held that the goal of copyright is 
furthered by the creation of transformative works.54 Therefore,  “the more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other 
factors.”55 Additionally, as if to reinforce the displacement of market harm 
 
 45.  Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.1105, 1111 (1990). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 1107–08. 
 49.  Id. at 1112. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994). 
 52.  Id. at 573. 
 53.  Id. at 579–94. 
 54.  Id. at 579. 
 55.  Id. 
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as the primary fair use consideration, Justice Souter added that when “the 
second use is transformative, market substitution is at least less certain, and 
market harm may not be so readily inferred.”56 
The Campbell Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in stopping its 
analysis after concluding the commercial nature of “Pretty Woman” 
rendered it unfair, and remanded the case to analyze transformation using 
Judge Leval’s ideas.57 In doing so, the Court changed the way lower courts 
interpreted the fair use defense by shifting the test away from the fourth 
factor and towards determining how transformative the new work is of the 
original work. Lower courts have zealously adopted Judge Leval’s 
transformation consideration. In a study of fair use cases from 2006 to 2010, 
the data showed that the “fair use doctrine today is overwhelmingly 
dominated by the Leval-Campbell transformative use doctrine.”58 As two 
scholars put it, “[u]nfortunately, in the ensuing two decades, the ambiguity 
surrounding the [fair use] doctrine has, if anything, increased.”59 This has led 
to a wide variety of different rationales in opinions, causing uncertainty in 
fair use decisions.60 This doctrinal murkiness61 eventually found its way into 
the realm of appropriation art. 
III.  APPROPRIATION ART AND CASE LAW HISTORY 
A.  Appropriation Art Primer 
Appropriation art refers to the act of reusing existing elements to create 
a new work.62  The term operates under a number of technical definitions, 
but the most relevant to this discussion is “[t]he use of pre-existing objects 
or images with little transformation.”63 Appropriation artists “believe that in 
borrowing existing imagery or elements of imagery, they are re-
contextualizing . . . the original imagery, allowing the viewer to renegotiate 
 
 56.  Id. at 591. 
 57.  Id. at 594. 
 58.  Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 736 
(2011). 
 59.  Bunker & Calvert, supra note 44, at 95. 
 60.  See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 
U. OF PA. L. REV. 549 (2008). 
 61.  Bunker & Calvert, supra note 44, at 95. 
 62.  Hayley A. Rowe, Appropriation in Contemporary Art, 3 STUDENTPULSE 06 (2011), 
http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/546/appropriation-in-contemporary-art. 
 63.  IAN CHILVERS & JOHN GLAVES-SMITH, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY 
ART 27 (2nd ed. 2008) (emphasis added); see also Appropriation, TATE, 
http://www.tate.org.uk/learn/online-resources/glossary/a/appropriation (“Appropriation in art and art 
history refers to the practice of artists using pre-existing objects or images in their art with little 
transformation of the original.”). 
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the meaning of the original in a different, more relevant, or more current 
context.”64 
Appropriation artists have argued that a change in medium65 or context, 
such as a display in a gallery, can be transformative even if the actual work 
is not altered.66 This has led to the appropriation artist movement being 
dubbed as “the most radical challenge to the copyright laws to date.”67 While 
appropriation artists test the boundaries of copyright law, this has not stopped 
artists such as Jeff Koons from continuing to appropriate previous works to 
create their own. 
B.  Pre-Campbell: Parody Versus Satire 
Koons is no stranger to copyright infringement claims. While he has 
been a part of several lawsuits, his most infamous case involves a picture of 
a litter of puppies and a sculpture. In 1989, Art Rogers, a professional 
photographer, brought a copyright infringement action against Koons, 
alleging that Koons’ String of Puppies68 infringed a commissioned 
photograph69 Rogers had taken years earlier of an acquaintance’s puppies.70 
Rodgers was convinced the photo would not work on its own, so he asked 
the owner and his wife to hold the eight puppies for the photograph.71 After 
Rogers’ photograph was licensed, it was also produced and distributed as a 
notecard beginning in 1984.72 Koons purchased the card in 1987 and 
demonstrated it to his team of artisans as what he envisioned for his new 
work; he wanted the sculpture to be “copied faithfully” from the photograph 
and for the work to “be just like the photo.”73 In the subsequent copyright 
infringement suit, Koons asserted a fair use defense, but the district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Rogers.74 
 
 64.  Rowe, supra note 62, at 1. 
 65.  John Koegel & Barton Beebe, Article: The Interview: John Koegel & Barton Beebe, 4 N.Y.U.J. 
INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW 183, 189–90 (2014). John Koegel, Jeff Koon’s counsel in the Rogers case 
stated, “I argued that a mere change in medium was sufficient to exempt a work from being infringing.” 
Id. However, he did go on to note, “changing medium should be significant, but not absolute.” Id. 
 66.  Kim Landsman, Cariou v. Prince Confirms Importance of Transformativeness, LAW360 (May 
1, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/437497/cariou-v-prince-confirms-importance-of-
transformativeness. 
 67.  Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and Post-Modernism, 11 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 33 (1992). 
 68.  See infra Figure 4. 
 69.  See infra Figure 5. 
 70.  Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 305. 
 74.  Id. at 305–06. 
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In affirming the lower court’s summary judgment motion, the Second 
Circuit conducted its own fair use analysis.75 Because this case preceded the 
Supreme Court ruling in Campbell, the Second Circuit did not address the 
transformative nature of the allegedly infringing work. Instead, the court 
focused heavily on whether Koons’ work was a parody or satire, because 
Koons claimed that String of Puppies was a “fair social criticism.”76 
The court found that String of Puppies was a “satirical critique of our 
materialistic society” but was unable to find any parody of the photograph 
itself.77 It also held that for a work to be a parody, the “copied work must be, 
at least in part, an object of the parody, otherwise there would be no need to 
conjure up the original work.”78 The court held that String of Puppies was a 
social commentary as a whole but found no parody of the original 
photograph. Therefore, there was no need to conjure up the original 
photograph, resulting in the first factor weighing against a finding of fair 
use.79 The court then analyzed the remaining three factors, and found that all 
three factors weighed against a finding of fair use.80 The court found that 
Rogers’ work was a creative original expression subject to broad copyright 
protection and that Koons copied the essence of the photograph and 
incorporated the expression of the work Rogers created.81 Because Koons 
only produced the work to sell it as high-priced art, the likelihood of future 
harm to Rogers was presumed.82 
Koons was unable to mount a winning fair use defense, because his new 
work did not comment on or parody the original in any way. Koons would 
again face a copyright infringement action almost twenty years later when 
he compiled and used images from advertisements to create another work. 
However, this case followed the Campbell decision. With the new precedent 
set in a fair use analysis, Koons was able to change his strategy, focus on 
how his new work added a new meaning and message different from the 
original, and persuade the court that his work was transformative. 
 
 75.  Id. at 308–12. 
 76.  Id. at 309. 
 77.  Id. at 310. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 310–12. 
 81.  Id. at 310–11. 
 82.  Id. at 312. 
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C.  Post-Campbell: Adopting Transformation 
By the mid 2000’s, Koons was a litigation veteran. However, the 
Campbell decision turned the tide in favor of appropriation artists, such as 
Koons. As a result, Koons, with help from his counsel, was able to change 
his defense by tailoring arguments to the change in the law.83 
Andrea Blanch was an accomplished professional fashion photographer 
whose work appeared in numerous magazines, including Vogue and 
Allure.84 Blanch took a photograph depicting a woman’s legs and feet 
wearing Gucci sandals resting in a man’s lap.85 The photograph, entitled 
“Silk Sandals,” was published in Allure magazine as part of a six-page 
feature on metallic cosmetics.86 
Deutsche Bank commissioned Koons to create an art exhibition in 
collaboration with the Guggenheim Museum. For the exhibition, Koons 
created a collection of works entitled “Easyfun-Ethereal.”87 In creating 
“Easyfun-Ethereal,” Koons gathered images from advertisements, scanned 
them, and digitally superimposed the images against backgrounds of pastoral 
landscapes.88 Among the images Koons used to create his work “Niagara,”89 
he used Blanch’s “Silk Sandals.”90 Koons incorporated only the legs and feet 
from the photograph, inverted the orientation of the legs, the number of pairs 
of legs used, and modified the photograph’s coloring.91 Blanch brought an 
action against Koons, claiming that “Niagara” infringed her copyright to 
“Silk Sandals.”92 
The Second Circuit, in affirming the lower court’s summary judgment 
motion in favor of Koons, analyzed the fair use defense and the 
transformative nature of “Niagara.” The court had already accepted the 
reasoning in Campbell, and as a result, was well-versed in applying the 
transformation test.93 To do so, the court determined whether “Niagara’s” 
 
 83.  Koegel & Beebe, supra note 65, at 189. John Koegel, Jeff Koons’ attorney, stated, “I was trying 
to get the judge to understand [Koons]’s artistic expression as something that ought to be within the safe 
harbor that [Sony and Harper Row] provided. Transformation was not a factor or consideration in Rogers. 
Transformation wasn’t part of the lexicon. That did not come until later, until Campbell.” Id. 
 84.  Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 85.  Id. at 248. 
 86.  Id.; see infra Figure 5. 
 87.  Blanch, 467 F.3d, at 247. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  See infra Figure 6. 
 90.  Blanch, 467 F.3d at 247–48. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 249. 
 93.  Id. at 251. 
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use of “Silk Sandals” was transformative, or whether “Niagara” “merely 
supersedes the objects of the original creation, or instead adds something 
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message.”94 However, this determination required 
the court to consider the meaning of each work, and therefore, to make 
subjective judgments of the two artists’ intent in creating their works. 
Koons wisely argued use of different mediums or other technical 
details, but also structured his defense upon the fact that his purpose in 
creating “Niagara” was in stark contrast with Blanch’s goal in creating “Silk 
Sandals.”95 The court agreed, finding that Koons used Blanch’s image to 
comment on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media. This 
different use of the image “confirms the transformative nature of the use.”96 
The court went on to say that the transformative test “almost perfectly 
describes Koons’s adaptation of ‘Silk Sandals,’”97 and unsurprisingly, that 
Koons’ use of “Silk Sandals” was transformative. 98 The court further noted 
that Koons justified taking the “Silk Sandals” photograph.99 In doing so, the 
court concluded that Koons had “a genuine creative rationale for borrowing 
Blanch’s image,” based entirely on Koons’ own word: 
I considered them to be necessary for inclusion in my painting rather than 
legs I might have photographed myself. The ubiquity of the photograph is 
central to my message. The photograph is typical of a certain style of mass 
communication. . . . I thus comment upon the culture and attitudes 
promoted and embodied in Allure Magazine.100 
After finding the new work transformative, the court then gave less weight 
to the other statutory factors. 
Addressing the second factor, “the nature of the copyrighted work,” the 
court concluded that although Blanch’s work was a creative expression close 
to the core of copyright protection, its weight in the fair use balance was 
diminished when the creative work of art was being used for a transformative 
 
 94.  Id. at 253 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). 
 95.  Id. at 252. Koons stated that he wanted the viewer “to think about his/her personal experience 
with these objects, products, and images and at the same time gain new insight into how these affect our 
lives.” Id. Comparatively, Blanch stated, “I wanted to show some sort of erotic sense.” Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 253 (“[T]he use of a fashion photograph created for publication in a glossy American 
‘lifestyles’ magazine—with changes of its colors, the background against which it is portrayed, the 
medium, the size of the objects pictured, the objects’ details and, crucially, their entirely different purpose 
and meaning—as part of a massive painting commissioned for exhibition in a German art-gallery 
space.”). 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 255. 
 100.  Id. 
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purpose.101 Therefore, it did not matter that the second factor weighed in 
favor of Blanch. 
The court also held in favor of Koons with regards to the third factor, 
“the amount and substantiality of the portion used,” finding that Koons’ 
appropriation to be reasonable, in light of his purpose for copying. Because 
Koons used only the legs from the photograph, the court determined that he 
only copied what was “necessary to evoke a certain style of mass 
communication,” and the court found the third factor to weigh in Koons’ 
favor.102 Finally, the court found the fourth factor, “the effect of the use upon 
the potential market,” to weigh in favor of Koons, because Blanch had not 
published or licensed “Silk Sandals” in any other publication but Allure. 
Blanch further admitted that “Niagara” had not upset any plans she had for 
the photograph, or for future ones.103 In light of those admissions, the court 
found no deleterious effect on the potential market value for “Silk 
Sandals.”104 
As a result of the intervening Campbell case, the Second Circuit gave 
significant weight to the transformative nature of “Niagara,” and did not 
emphasize the other three statutory factors. However, this approach to fair 
use was not limited to Blanch alone. A more recent decision involving 
another appropriation artist, Richard Prince, took the focus of transformation 
one step further. This time, the Second Circuit, in Cariou v. Prince, further 
expanded the precedent set forth in Campbell, which many appropriations 
artists found to be a major victory.105 However, not everyone believes the 
decision benefited the artistic community, because artists will no longer have 
to take responsibility for their work.106 
 
 101.  Id. at 257. 
 102.  Id. at 258. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Nicholas O’Donnell, No Infringement in Cariou v. Prince-Second Circuit Plays Art Critic and 
Finds Fair Use, ART LAW REPORT (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.artlawreport.com/2013/04/25/no-
infringement-in-cariou-v-prince-second-circuit-plays-critic-and-finds-fair-use/. 
 106.  Nathanael Karl Harrison, Appropriation Art and U.S. Intellectual Property Law Since 1976, 
121–22 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with the University of California, San Diego, 
library system) (“[W]hile the artist may have prevailed in the short-term, the long-term impact the 
[Cariou] court ruling will have on artistic practices is concerning—not from the standpoint of legal 
viability, but rather because the appeals court decision works toward absolving artists of the need to 
critically question the images, objects and texts they appropriate. I want to insist on the idea of the artist’s, 
if not legal, then ethical responsibility towards the images he or she uses.”). 
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D.  Transformation Usurps the Four Statutory Factors 
In 2013, the Second Circuit once again decided a copyright 
infringement case involving an appropriation artist and further expanded the 
fair use defense. The court’s holding in Cariou v. Prince focused on the 
transformative nature of the allegedly infringing work, and expanded the 
exceptions to the exclusive rights of a copyright by holding that “the law 
does not require that a secondary use comment on the original artist or work, 
or popular culture.”107 
Patrick Cariou is a professional photographer who lived among 
Rastafarians in Jamaica for six years during the 1990’s.108 He developed a 
significant relationship with the Rastafarians, and as a result, they allowed 
him to take portraits and landscape photographs. Cariou compiled these 
photographs, and published them in a book entitled “Yes Rasta.”109 The book 
enjoyed limited commercial success, earning Cariou only $8,000 from book 
sales. Except for a handful of private sales, Cariou never sold or licensed 
individual photographs.110 
Richard Prince, an already established appropriation artist, came across 
a copy of “Yes Rasta” in 2005 at a bookshop.111 Between 2007 and 2008, 
Prince held a show in St. Barth’s that included 35 photographs torn out of 
“Yes Rasta” that were manipulated in various ways, including painting 
lozenges over the subjects’ faces.112 
Prince acquired three additional copies of “Yes Rasta” and went on to 
create an additional thirty works in what became known as the “Canal Zone” 
series.113 The portions used from “Yes Rasta” vary from piece to piece, but 
in some of the “Canal Zone” pieces, Prince did as little as “paint blue 
lozenges over the subject’s eyes and mouth, and paste a picture of a guitar 
over the subject’s body.”114 
The Gagosian gallery in New York City held a show between 
November and December 2008 that included 22 works from Prince’s “Canal 
Zone” series.115 Prior to this show, a gallery owner named Christiane Celle 
contacted Cariou about a potential exhibit in New York City for “Yes 
 
 107.  Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 108.  Id. at 699. 
 109.  Id.; see infra Figure 7. 
 110.  Cariou, 714 F.3d, at 699. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id.; see infra, Figure 8. 
 113.  Cariou, 714 F.3d at 699. 
 114.  Id. at 701. 
 115.  Id. at 703. 
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Rasta.”116 The two communicated back and forth discussing terms, but when 
Celle learned of Prince’s show at the Gagosian, she mistakenly concluded 
that Cariou was working with Prince and “decided that she would not put on 
a ‘Rasta show’ because it had been ‘done already.’”117 When Cariou learned 
of the show at the Gagosian in December 2008, he sued Prince for copyright 
infringement.118 
At the trial level, the court rejected Prince’s summary judgment motion, 
asserting a fair use defense concluding, “Prince did not intend to comment 
on Cariou’s Photos, or on aspects of popular culture.”119 The Second Circuit 
held that the lower court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying 
Prince’s summary judgment motion, and clarified the correct standard, 
opining that instead of “confining our inquiry to Prince’s explanations of his 
artworks . . . The focus of our infringement analysis is primarily on the Prince 
artworks themselves.”120 Subsequently, the court concluded that twenty-five 
of the thirty works from the “Canal Zone” series were transformative as a 
matter of law.121 
The circuit court reached its decision by first discussing the Leval 
article and the Campbell decision, stressing that a transformative work need 
not comment on the author or the original work. However, the transformative 
work must still provide a “new expression, meaning, or message.”122 The 
court went on to state that when transformative use is at issue, courts must 
examine works to determine how they “may reasonably be perceived in order 
to assess their transformative nature.”123 The court compared the “Yes Rasta” 
and “Canal Zone” images side by side and concluded that Prince had not 
presented the same material as Cariou.124 Instead, Prince added something 
new with a different aesthetic.125 Cariou produced serene and deliberately 
composed photographs, while Prince’s “crude and jarring works, on the 
other hand, are hectic and provocative.”126 Justice Holmes’ words from his 
Bleistein opinion seemed to be forgotten by this panel; the judges interpreted 
the meaning of an artist’s work in order to make legal judgments. 
 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 704. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 120.  Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 706 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). 
 123.  Id. at 707. 
 124.  Id. at 707–08. 
 125.  Id. at 707. 
 126.  Id. at 706. 
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As a result of the transformative nature of Prince’s works, the court 
gave significantly less weight to the fact that the works were for commercial 
purposes, that Cariou’s work was a creative published expression, and 
determined that Prince only took the amount necessary to “fulfill its 
transformative purpose.”127 Additionally, the court stated that Prince’s work 
did not dilute the potential market value for Cariou’s photographs, as 
“Prince’s audience is very different from Cariou’s  . . . [his] work appeals to 
an entirely different sort of collector than Cariou’s.”128 While Prince’s work 
attracted well-known celebrities, artists, and professional athletes, Cariou 
had not “actively marketed his work or sold work for significant sums.”129 
With this in mind, the court held that Prince’s work did not usurp the market 
of “Yes Rasta.”130 
The Second Circuit has continued to expand the fair use doctrine from 
Rogers to Cariou. In Rogers, the court concluded that Koons commented on 
society as a whole and not the original work.131 Therefore, fair use was not 
valid defense.132 In Cariou, the court concluded new works did not need to 
comment on the original and that the court should decide whether the use 
was transformative.133 This determination would occur by deciding how the 
new work would be “reasonably perceived.”134 This shift in the fair use 
analysis can be traced back to the intervening Campbell case. The precedent 
the case establishes makes it substantially easier for appropriation artists to 
argue a work is transformative, while directing courts to give significantly 
less weight to the remaining statutory factors.135 Finally, this excessive focus 
on the transformative nature of a secondary work requires judges to interpret 
and critique art, which Justice Holmes cautioned against long before 
Campbell.136 While this may be the established precedent in the Second 
Circuit, at least one other circuit is not following suit.137 
 
 127.  Id. at 710. 
 128.  Id. at 709. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 132.  Id. at 310–12. 
 133.  Cariou, 714 F.3d at 698. 
 134.  Id. at 707. 
 135.  See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
 136.   Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
 137.  See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014), cert denied, 2015 U.S. 
LEXIS 1921 (2015). 
6 ZWISLER - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/16  3:02 PM 
2016] (MIS)APPROPRIATION ART 181 
IV.  THE FAIR USE PROBLEM ACROSS THE CIRCUITS 
A.  Introduction 
As the preceding sections have illustrated, the Supreme Court’s focus 
on transformation has led the lower courts to interpret the doctrine in ways 
that have expanded fair use. However, the Seventh Circuit has refused to 
analyze the transformation sub-factor entirely. This has led to a split among 
the circuits, which the Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to 
resolve.138 
This section will analyze how three different circuits would interpret 
Davidovici v. Koons, based on the leading fair use case in each circuit. 
B.  The Second Circuit and Fair Use; The Transformative Test 
Applying the rationale of Cariou to the facts of Davidovici, it is likely 
the Second Circuit would find fair use. The heavy reliance on the 
transformation of the new work, and the fact that Koons’ work need not 
comment on the original Naf Naf advertisement tips the scale in favor of fair 
use. 
To begin, the court would look at the two works side by side to 
determine how Koons’ work would be reasonably perceived and conclude 
that the sculpture has a different character, gives Davidovici’s photograph a 
new expression, and employs new aesthetics distinct from Davidovici’s.139 
Koons’ addition of a lei on the pig and the two penguins are notable 
differences, but a justice might find the most persuasive difference to be the 
see through top the woman wears. 
Just as the court concluded that Cariou’s photographs were “serene and 
deliberately composed portraits and landscape photographs,”140 it would 
come to a similar conclusion looking at Davidovici’s photograph. The 
Second Circuit would describe the photograph as a woman laying peacefully 
in the snow with a contemplative gaze. Also, because the Cariou court 
concluded, Prince’s works were “crude and jarring” and “hectic and 
provocative,”141 it would also conclude that Koons’ work is similarly 
 
 138.  Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 1921 (2015) (holding that Kienitz’s 
photograph of the mayor of Madison, Wisconsin, was appropriated by defendant Sconnie Nation on 
commercial t-shirts in order to criticize the mayor’s attempt to shut down an annual block party); Kienitz, 
766 F.3d, at 757, 758–59 (deciding not to follow Cariou and instead determining the copying was fair 
use). 
 139.  See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707–08. 
 140.  Id. at 706. 
 141.  Id. 
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provocative, because the sculpture depicts a nearly identical looking woman 
with her breasts exposed. The court would see Koons’ statue as it was 
described in the original exhibit catalog for his “Banality” series, “a Walt 
Disney version of an erotic fantasy.”142 This would lead the court to the 
conclusion that Koons’ work has a different character, and therefore, is 
transformative. The first factor would be decided based on the aesthetic 
findings of the judges— persons who likely have no training in the fine arts, 
yet are compelled to make these findings as a result of the transformative 
test. 
The Cariou court did not find that the commercial nature of Prince’s 
work was a factor that substantially weighed against a finding of fair use.143 
It would do the same in this instance, as “[t]he more transformative the new 
work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like 
commercialism.”144 Similarly, the court would give less weight to the other 
statutory factors as well. 
Turning to the next statutory factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, 
the court would find that Davidovici’s photograph is a work worthy of 
copyright protection. However, just as the court found with the commercial 
nature of the work, this factor “may be of limited usefulness where . . . [a] 
creative work of art is being used for a transformative purpose.”145 
The Cariou court determined that Prince had not taken more than 
necessary from the original photographs, and it would reach the same 
conclusion here. The court would conclude that Koons needed to “conjure 
up at least enough of the original to fulfill its transformative purpose,”146 and 
create a new distinct work. In finding that this factor weighed heavily in 
Prince’s favor, the Cariou court stated he “transformed those photographs 
into something new and different.”147 Similarly, the court would find Koons 
only took what was necessary to conjure up the original and created 
something new. The main components of Davidocivi’s photograph were the 
woman in the snow and the pig above her head.148 The court would conclude 
that in order to conjure up enough of the original, Koons needed to include 
these components in his sculpture. Moreover, Koons added differences, such 
 
 142.  Luke Malone, Jeff Koons Sued for Ripping Off Artists-Again, VOCATIV (Dec. 17, 2014) 
http://www.vocativ.com/culture/art-culture/jeff-koons-copyright-infringement-naf/. 
 143.  See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706. 
 144.  Id. at 708. 
 145.  Id. at 710 (internal quotations omitted). 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  See infra Figure 1. 
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as the mesh top the woman wears and the lei around the pig, in order to create 
something new. 
The court would then look to any effect on the potential market for 
Davidovici’s photograph. Currently, there is no information about any lost 
profits or licenses Davidovici incurred. If he suffered any lost profits or 
licenses, it would be wise to argue them fiercely, in order to persuade the 
court of a non-fair use. However, because the Second Circuit has called the 
first factor “[t]he heart of a fair use inquiry,”149 it would assign significant 
weight to the transformation of the new work, and less weight would be 
given to the market effect factor. This would ultimately lead to a finding in 
favor of Koons and fair use. 
C.  The Ninth Circuit and Fair Use; The Transformative Test 
A similar rationale would be used in the Ninth Circuit, as it follows the 
precedent set forth in Campbell. In Seltzer v. Green Day, the Ninth Circuit 
was tasked with determining whether the use of an artist’s drawing in a music 
video qualified as fair use.150 Dereck Seltzer created a drawing entitled 
Scream Icon in 2003,151 which he posted around Los Angeles as street art.152 
Seltzer used the design to identify himself and licensed it for use in another 
music video.153 Roger Staub, video designer for the band Green Day, created 
backdrop videos for each of the 32 songs the band played on its 2009-2010 
tour.154 In 2008, he took a photograph of a wall in Los Angeles, which 
included Scream Icon.155 Staub used the photograph to create a modified 
version of Scream Icon and included the new work in a four minute long 
video for the song “East Jesus Nowhere.”156 Seltzer eventually learned of the 
unauthorized use and filed a claim for copyright infringement, to which the 
band asserted a fair use defense.157 
The circuit court began its fair use analysis by stating that whether the 
new work is transformative is a key factor, but that “is a[n] often highly 
contentious topic,” citing the then-recent Cariou decision.158 The court did 
 
 149.  Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 150.  Seltzer v. Green Day Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 151.  Id. at 1173; see infra Figure 9. 
 152.  Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1174. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id.; see infra Figure 10. 
 157.  Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1175. 
 158.  Id. at 1176. 
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not follow the Second Circuit’s rationale and concluded that it should follow 
the test set forth in Campbell.159 It then determined whether the new work 
added a new expression, meaning, or message to the original.160 In order to 
do this, the court examined each work and found that the message and 
meaning of Scream Icon was debatable, even though it appeared to “be a 
directionless anguished screaming face.”161 Although the ultimate meaning 
behind the work was not decided, the court concluded that it did not have 
anything to do with religion, while Staub’s video was “surrounded by 
religious iconography,” accompanying a song “about the hypocrisy of 
religion.”162 The court determined that the video backdrop conveyed “new 
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings,” as Seltzer 
admitted during his deposition.163 With this in mind, the court concluded that 
the new work was transformative.164 
The Seltzer court then addressed the second fair use factor—the nature 
of the copyrighted work—and determined that Scream Icon was a creative 
work “meriting strong protection.”165 The court found that Seltzer’s work 
was published, because it was widely disseminated on the Internet, as well 
as the streets of Los Angeles.166 Published works are more likely to qualify 
as fair use, because the first appearance of the artist’s expression has already 
occurred.167 Therefore, the court determined that this factor weighed only 
“slightly in Seltzer’s favor.”168 
When analyzing the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, the Seltzer court 
concluded that unlike a television show or book, Scream Icon was “not 
meaningfully divisible.”169 The court noted that an alleged infringer would 
not have this factor weighed against him or her, even if they copied the whole 
work, if no more of the original work is taken than is necessary for the 
 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 1177. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. During his deposition Seltzer stated that the backdrop “tainted the original message of the 
image and [] made it now synonymous with lyrics, a video, and concert tour that it was not originally 
intended to be used with.” Id. (omission theirs). 
 164.  Id. at 1178. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 168.  Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1178. 
 169.  Id. 
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intended use.170 The court concluded that in order for the new meaning of the 
backdrop video to be achieved, the “use of the entire work was necessary.”171 
The court ultimately concluded that the use of Scream Icon did not 
deplete any market value for Seltzer, and that the fourth factor weighed in 
favor of Green Day.172 Seltzer admitted that no one ever told him they would 
not buy his work, because of the use of the image in the video. Instead, he 
claimed “that Scream Icon was ‘tarnished’ for him personally.”173 Green Day 
also presented evidence that the video backdrop did not provide the same 
market function as the original, because it was never used for any marketing 
purposes.174 Further, Seltzer did not provide any evidence of lost licensing 
opportunities for the image, although he did state that it was used in a music 
video by the band People. However, he did not provide any additional 
information about a licensing agreement with People.175 The court found 
these reasons were sufficient for it to conclude that the fourth factor did not 
weigh against a finding of fair use.176 
If the Davidovici case were to be brought in the Ninth Circuit, the court 
would likely find that Koons’ work was a transformation. While this circuit 
does not follow the Cariou rationale, which dictates that the secondary work 
need not comment on the original, the judges would still be forced to provide 
their own subjective views and determine the meaning behind both works. 
They may split on the actual meanings behind the work or works, just as the 
meaning of Scream Icon was not determined. However, the judges will use 
their limited knowledge of the fine arts to determine the transformation of 
Koons’ and Davidovici’s work. The court would look at the works side by 
side, and determine their meanings based on subjective aesthetic judgments. 
As the Seltzer court found the new work to be transformative, the same 
would likely be found in Davidovici. 
Looking at the nature of Davidovici’s photograph, the court would 
conclude that it is an original work of authorship warranting the same amount 
of protection as Seltzer’s Scream Icon. Additionally, the advertisement was 
published, because it was used in a magazine. Therefore, the first appearance 
of Davidovici’s expression already occurred. Thus, the court would 
 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. at 1178–79. 
 172.  Id. at 1179. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
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determine that the photograph is a creative expression worthy of protection, 
but would only weigh the factor slightly in favor of Davidovici. 
The Seltzer court determined that the defendant’s copying was 
necessary to achieve the alternate meaning behind the new work.177 The same 
analysis would likely be applied in the Davidovici case, and the court would 
determine that Koons’ taking from the original work was not more than 
necessary, because it was needed to establish the new meaning of Koons’ 
work. 
While the Seltzer court did not declare that the fourth factor should be 
given substantial weight, it did seem to implicitly state that if Seltzer 
provided more information about his licensing of Scream Icon, he might 
have been able to sway the court in his favor, at least on the issue of the 
fourth factor.178 If the Davidovici case were to be brought in this circuit, 
Davidovici would be best served by bringing forth evidence about any 
significant licensing opportunities he had concerning his original image, and 
any diminution of value he may have incurred. While the Second Circuit did 
not emphasize Cariou’s lost gallery opportunity, and easily divided the 
markets of the two artists,179 the Ninth Circuit did not draw a significant 
distinction between Green Day’s market and Seltzer’s market. If Davidovici 
were to bring strong evidence of market diminution, it has the potential to be 
a significant, and possibly dispositive factor in the court’s fair use analysis. 
While the Ninth Circuit adamantly follows the Campbell precedent, and 
the Second Circuit has further broadened the scope of fair use, the Seventh 
Circuit refused to follow the transformative test altogether. In its recent 
opinion, Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, this circuit cautioned against the 
Second Circuit’s expansion of the fair use doctrine and called for a return to 
the factors listed in the statute.180 
D.  The Seventh Circuit and Fair Use; The Statutory List Test 
While the Second and Ninth Circuits would focus on the transformation 
of Koons’ work, the Seventh Circuit would take an entirely different 
approach. In Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, the court was asked to determine 
if appropriating a photograph of a former mayor for use on a t-shirt was fair 
 
 177.  Id. at 1178–79. 
 178.  Id. at 1179 (“Seltzer provides no additional information about . . . licensing . . . [w]ithout further 
context, this fact does not suffice to show that Green Day’s use harmed any existing market or a market 
that Seltzer was likely to develop.”). 
 179.  Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709 (2013). 
 180.  Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014), cert denied, 2015 U.S. 
LEXIS 1921; see infra Figure 11; see infra Figure 12. 
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use.181 The court stated it was skeptical of the Second Circuit’s, and of 
“Cariou’s approach, because asking exclusively whether something is 
‘transformative’ not only replaces the list in § 107 [the four fair use factors] 
but also could override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).”182 
The Kienitz court decided that it would not address transformative use 
and that it was “best to stick with the statutory list, of which the most 
important usually is the fourth (market effect).”183 Without bringing in 
aesthetic judgments, such as determining the meaning of each work or 
finding any transformation, the court quickly considered the purpose and 
character of the new work.184 It determined that while the defendants did sell 
their t-shirts for profit, they chose the design “as a form of political 
commentary.”185 The judge stated the first factor did not “do much in this 
case,”186 but concluded that the factor did weigh in favor of fair use.187 
The court found the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, 
to be “unilluminating,”188 and did not give it significant analysis. After 
analyzing the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work, the court determined the defendants had 
not taken more than was necessary from the original photograph.189 The court 
concluded that the defendants removed the colors, shading, and the original 
background.190 Further, the lighting was significantly altered from the 
original work, so that after all the changes, only the mayor’s smile remained 
from the original work.191 
Analyzing factor four—the effect on the market for the original work—
the court concluded that there was no effect, because the plaintiff admitted 
that the defendant’s use did not disrupt any plan to license the photograph 
for apparel, or that the use reduced demand for the original.192 However, at 
the end of the majority opinion, Judge Easterbrook outlined an argument that 
Kienitz could have made to persuade the court that the fourth factor should 
 
 181.  Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758; see infra Figure 11; see infra Figure 12. 
 182.  Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758; 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (reserving the exclusive right to the author to 
“prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work”). 
 183.  Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758. 
 184.  Id. at 759. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. 
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be weighed against a fair use finding.193 He stated that the use could injure 
long-range commercial opportunities, despite the value of the particular 
picture not being diminished.194 He posited a scenario where “[f]ewer people 
will hire or cooperate with Kienitz if they think that the high quality of his 
work will make the photos more effective when used against them!”195 
If the Davidovici case were brought in this circuit, the court would not 
consider the transformation test. Instead, it would look to the commercial 
nature of Koons’ work. The commercial nature of the work is easily 
identifiable, because Koons sells his statues. The court may additionally look 
at any comments, if any, on the original work. Just as this factor proved to 
be of little help in Kienitz, it would likely be of little help in Davidovici. 
Therefore, the first fair use factor would not weigh significantly in favor of 
either party. 
The court would not dwell on the second factor—calling this factor 
“unilluminating”196—and would instead move to the third factor, the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work. 
Koons took significant parts of Davidovici’s photograph to create his work, 
including: the pose of the woman lying in the snow, her facial expression, 
and the pig at the top of her head with a barrel around its neck. All of these 
elements are prominent in Koons’ work. The similarities between 
Davidovici’s photograph and Koons’ sculpture are readily apparent, and this 
court would likely not weigh this factor the same way as it did in Kienitz.197 
Therefore, the Davidovici court would likely hold that Koons had taken far 
more than was necessary in order to comment on the original 
The fourth factor would be heavily discussed in the Seventh Circuit, 
because the Kienitz court stated it is usually the most important factor.198 
While it is not known whether Davidovici incurred any loss of licensing 
opportunities or if the value of the original photograph diminished, he might 
be able to prevail overall if he provided sufficient evidence of market harm, 
because the market effect factor is heavily stressed in this circuit. 
As demonstrated above, it is possible that there would be a finding of 
fair use in Davidovici, but the Seventh Circuit would reach that conclusion 
using an approach that differs from its sister circuits. Without the subjectivity 
required in finding whether or not the new work is a transformation, the court 
 
 193.  Id. at 759–60. 
 194.  Id. at 759. 
 195.  Id. at 759–60. 
 196.  Id. at 759. 
 197.  Id. at 758. 
 198.  Id. 
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would analyze the four fair use factors in a more straightforward, and 
efficient manner. Additionally, if Davidovici has suffered market harm from 
Koons’ use, he may successfully argue that the fourth factor weighs in his 
favor and ultimately succeed. 
As this section has illustrated, the fair use doctrine is not applied in the 
same manner throughout the circuits. Appropriation artists could have a 
greater opportunity for a winning fair use defense if the circuit the suit takes 
place in is favorable to them. Additionally, the transformative test requires 
judges to make subjective interpretations about art in order to determine a 
legal outcome. The next section will discuss a new approach to the fair use 
test, and consider how attribution of copyrighted works will benefit fair use 
analyses. 
V.  A NEW FAIR USE APPROACH 
This section argues that the Seventh Circuit is correct in holding that 
the transformative test should no longer be applied in appropriation art cases, 
because it requires judges to act as critics. Courts should shift back to a more 
straightforward four-factor analysis, and mostly focus on the fourth factor—
the market effect. While many courts are inclined to only consider the market 
harm of a plaintiff, this section describes the need for the balancing of the 
positive effect an appropriation artist can have on the market for another’s 
work, against any market harm to the plaintiff. Additionally, this section will 
consider what effect attributing the original copyright holder would have on 
a fair use analysis. 
A.  No More Transformation 
Requiring judges to determine transformation compels them to look to 
the meaning of the artworks at issue, and requires them to determine what 
the artists intended to create. That is exactly what the court did in Cariou 
when the judges looked at the artworks and photographs side-by-side and 
determined that Prince’s work gave “a different character . . . new 
expression[] and employ[ed] new aesthetics with creative and 
communicative results distinct from Cariou’s.”199 In a dissenting opinion, 
Judge Wallace quoted the words of Justice Holmes from the Bleistein 
opinion and stated “I, for one, do not believe that I am in a position to make 
 
 199.  Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2013). 
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these fact-and-opinion-intensive decisions.”200 He came to this conclusion, 
in part, because of his “limited art experience.”201 
A number of scholars agree that because of the emphasis placed on 
transformation when analyzing fair use, judges critique art in direct contrast 
to a century old precedent.202 Doing away with the transformation sub-factor 
will eliminate this obligation for judges and end its domination of the fair 
use analysis. This will lead to more consistency among fair use decisions, 
because they will not be contingent upon judge’s personal subjective views 
of the works at issue. Specifically, in appropriation art cases, judges will not 
be forced to determine the meaning of the works at issue and allow that to 
be the driving force behind their decisions. 
While the transformative nature of the secondary work should be 
abandoned in appropriation art cases, courts should continue to look to other 
comments or critiques of the original work. Moreover, courts should 
additionally consider the purpose of the use or why the artist chose to use the 
original as source material. The precedent set forth in Cariou allows 
appropriation artists to use works with minimal limits and allows for minimal 
analysis of the purpose and character of the use, the original considerations 
of the first statutory factor. 
B.  Putting the Emphasis on the Fourth Factor 
With the focus no longer on whether the second work is a 
transformation, a judge will not act as a critic to determine a finding of fair 
use in appropriation art cases. Additionally, plaintiffs like Patrick Cariou, 
Dereck Seltzer, and Michael Kienitz will be able to bring potentially 
compelling arguments concerning market effect, arguments that helped Art 
Rogers succeed in his case. Plaintiffs will additionally be able to bring strong 
and potentially decisive arguments similar to what Judge Easterbrook laid 
out at the end of the Kienitz decision.203 
While plaintiffs, such as Dereck Seltzer, may object to the use of their 
work in appropriation art on moral grounds,204 those arguments will not 
 
 200.  Id. at 714 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  See, e.g., Brittani Everson, The Narrowest and Most Obvious Limits: Applying Fair Use to 
Appropriation Art Economically Using a Royalty System, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 729 (2014); Arjun Gupta, 
“I’ll Be Your Mirror”—Contemporary Art and the Role of Style in Infringement Analysis, 31 U. DAYTON 
L. REV. 45 (2005); Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 
(1998). 
 203.  Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 759–60. 
 204.  Seltzer v. Green Day Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013) (claiming that “Scream Icon 
was tarnished for [Seltzer] personally”). 
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compel a court to a finding of a non-fair use, because moral rights in the 
United States are limited.205 Moral rights only apply to visual artists who 
create a limited amount of works, and provide artists with the opportunity to 
have their names applied to or withheld from a work of visual art, prevent 
distortion or mutilation of a work, as well as prevent the destruction of a 
work of recognized stature.206 However, a focus on the fourth factor will 
allow a plaintiff to strategically and effectively argue against an 
appropriation when sharing Seltzer’s sentiment. 
Had the focus been on the fourth factor in prior cases, perhaps the 
plaintiffs in Blanch, Seltzer, and Kienitz would have provided more evidence 
of lost licensing opportunities or other negative effects on the market demand 
of their works. Instead, those cases focused on the transformative nature of 
the secondary work. Rather, as Judge Easterbrook suggested in Kienitz, 
plaintiffs should highlight how long-range commercial opportunities are 
affected when their work is used against them.207 
While an emphasis should be placed on the fourth factor, it is important 
for courts to not allow a plaintiff to claim that a second artist’s use of their 
material depleted the market that he or she had not already developed, or a 
market the plaintiff is unlikely to develop in the future.  While some courts 
have held that it is the original copyright holders’ right to enter or not enter 
certain markets,208 a copyright holder who suffers no market harm—either in 
current markets or in markets they do not intend to develop—is not 
economically burdened by secondary use.  Therefore, courts should be wary 
not to weigh the fourth factor in favor of a would-be infringer if the original 
artist cannot show he or she faced harm in relevant markets that are likely to 
be entered. Rather, a court could place a burden on the original artist with a 
standard such as preponderance of the evidence that he or she would likely 
enter into a market that the secondary user has usurped. 
A shift back to the fourth factor as usually being the most important 
should yield the aforementioned positive results, but it cannot be the only 
consideration. While appropriation art challenges the boundaries of 
 
 205.  17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  See Kienitz, 766 F.3d, at 759–60. 
 208.  See Castle Rock Ent. v. Carol Pub. Group, 150 F.3d 132, 145–46 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that a 
trivia book based on the television show Seinfeld was not fair use: “[a]lthough Castle Rock has evidenced 
little if any interest in exploiting . . . derivative works based on Seinfeld[,] . . . the copyright law must 
respect that creative and economic choice”); see also Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 
(2d Cir. 1987) (stating in its factor four analysis that “the proper inquiry concerns the ‘potential market’ 
for the copyrighted work . . . [an author] is entitled to protect his opportunity to sell his [copyrighted 
material]”) (emphasis in original) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012); Pacific and Southern Co. v. Duncan, 
744 F.2d 1490, 1496–97 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985)). 
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copyright law, it is a respected form of art, and should not be stifled. 
Appropriation artists that do not infringe others’ work are providing more 
creative work for the world, and therefore, are fulfilling the directive of the 
intellectual property clause of the Constitution to “promote the progress 
of . . . useful works.”209 Under the proposed legal framework, appropriation 
artists could counter plaintiffs’ potential negative market effects arguments 
by showing how the use of the original work improved market demand for 
that work. A court, looking at the effect on the market for the original work 
in totality, or the net market effect of both negative and positive effects to 
the market, could then determine whether a secondary use was a fair use or 
not. 
C. Market Harm Balanced Against Market Help 
The language of the fourth statutory factor states that a court shall 
examine, “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.”210 Nowhere does it state that courts must only look at any 
market harm a plaintiff has suffered. However, after Campbell, “market 
harm” has become the most common way to refer to the fourth factor.211 
While some courts have not followed this commonality,212 some scholars 
have begun exploring net market effects that include any market help by 
unauthorized use in addition to market harm.213 
Alternatively, “market help” has been described as the 
“underappreciated role of the economic upside of unauthorized use for 
owners”214 by a secondary work. This would be an appropriation artist’s ideal 
argument. Economic loss suffered by the original copyright owner must be 
balanced against any economic gain; one example was noted in Judge 
Leval’s famous Toward a Fair Use Standard.215 An appropriation artist, such 
 
 209.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (stating that Congress shall have the power to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
 210.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 211.  David Fagundes, Market Harm, Market Help, and Fair Use, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 359, 366 
n.28 (2014) (string-citing cases associating the fourth factor with the degree of market harm by 
defendant’s unauthorized use). 
 212.  See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[A] reasonable 
factfinder could only find that Google Books enhances the sales of books to the benefit of copyright 
holders.”); Faulkner Literary Rts. v. Sony Pictures Classics, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 701, 711 (N.D. Miss. 
2013) (“[T]hat the [secondary work] indeed helped the plaintiff and the market value of [the original 
work] if it had any effect at all.”). 
 213.  See Fagundes, supra note 211, at 377–78. 
 214.  Id. at 361. 
 215.  Leval, supra note 45, at 1124 (“An unjustified taking that enhances the market for the 
copyrighted work is easy to imagine. If, for example, a film director takes an unknown copyrighted tune 
6 ZWISLER - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/16  3:02 PM 
2016] (MIS)APPROPRIATION ART 193 
as Richard Prince or Jeff Koons, has the potential to use another’s work to 
create their own revenue stream, and increase the demand for the original 
work. These artists attract athletes, musicians, and other famous individuals 
who pay high prices for their pieces.216 These consumers may want to buy 
the original work as well. Thus, a piece of art that had little-to-no success 
may enjoy an increase in demand through secondary use.217 
However, while a popular appropriation artist may be able to bring 
another artist to the limelight quickly and increase demand, this is only one 
aspect of the market that needs to be addressed. Licensing is an important 
aspect of generating revenue from creative works. In each case mentioned 
herein, the courts discussed licensing opportunities.218 The original artist may 
argue that while demand in sales for their work has gone up, they also 
inherently lost revenue and a market opportunity because the secondary artist 
did not pay any licensing fee.219 Moreover, courts are not only to look at the 
market of a work at the time of a suit, but must also look to the potential 
effect on the market a secondary use may have.220 Therefore, it is necessary 
for courts to look to the potential for future lost revenue, such as the lost 
opportunities to license a work, which the original artist may suffer. This 
must be balanced against any positive effect on the market the secondary use 
may have had. 
Courts should look to the overall market effect of the original work and 
not solely examine market harm. While it is possible that an appropriation 
artist can bolster market demand of another artist’s work, it would be 
difficult to do if consumers cannot find out who the original artist is. 
 
for the score of a movie that becomes a hit, the composer may realize a windfall from the aftermarket for 
his composition.”). 
 216.  See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709 (2013) (“Certain of the Canal Zone artworks have sold 
for two million or more dollars. The invitation list for a dinner that Gagosian hosted in conjunction with 
the opening of the Canal Zone show included a number of the wealthy and famous such as . . . Jay-Z and 
Beyonce[,] . . . Tom Brady[,] . . . Robert DeNiro, Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt.”). 
 217.  Fagundes, supra note 211, at 381 (“[W]hen Shepard Fairey used one of Garcia’s photos of 
Barack Obama to make Fairey’s iconic ‘Hope’ poster, it was a boon to Garcia as well as to Fairey (and 
to Obama). Thanks to the affirming effect of Fairey’s unauthorized use, Garcia had a show of his Obama 
photo at a swanky Chelsea art gallery in 2009, where prints of Garcia’s work went for a cool $1,200 
apiece.”). 
 218.  See Cariou, 714.3d at 699; Seltzer v. Green Day Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2013); 
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 2004); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 219.  Gilbert, supra note 9 (“Koons hasn’t stopped using copyrighted material but now gets licences 
(sic) first—his ‘Popeye’ series, shown in 2009 at London’s Serpentine Gallery, is just one example. 
[Koons’ attorney] says that although responses to Koons’ requests vary, ‘hordes of people’ have granted 
permissions, including United Feature Syndicate, which had earlier sued him, and Marvel Comics.”). 
 220.  Harper & Row, Pubs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985) (“[T]o negate fair use one 
need only show that if the challenged use ‘should become widespread, it would adversely affect the 
potential market for the copyrighted work.’”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984)). 
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However, appropriation artists should provide attribution to the original 
artist in order to make them known to consumers and to bolster a fair use 
defense. 
D. Encouraging Appropriation Artists to Attribute Original Authors 
Applying a “market help” analysis to Cariou, Fagundes observed the 
Second Circuit’s implication “that the publicity generated by Prince’s 
infringement could only have helped the commercial success of Cariou’s 
book.”221 While such a holding is possible, two factors stand in the way. First, 
in its analysis of the fourth factor, the Cariou court split the markets that 
Patrick Cariou and Richard Prince appealed to, stating that the former’s work 
would not appeal to the latter’s. 222 Second, fans of Prince’s work could not 
know he used Cariou’s photographs if they were not already familiar with 
Cariou’s work, since Prince provided no attribution to the original work. 
The Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”), codified in 17 U.S.C. § 106A, 
provides that an author of a work of visual art shall have the right to “claim 
authorship of that work.”223 However, the statute begins by stating that the 
rights are subject to section 107,224 the fair use doctrine. While the majority 
of Prince’s work was considered to be a transformation by the Second Circuit 
and thus protected by fair use,225 he had no mandate under VARA to give 
Cariou any attribution for the use of his photographs. Unless one was already 
familiar with Cariou’s photographs, one would not know to look for them or 
any of his other works after viewing Prince’s artwork. Additionally, without 
attribution, viewers of Prince’s work would not know which parts of his 
artwork were appropriated, and which parts were not,226 leading a viewer to 
believe that perhaps the entire work was Prince’s. This is similar to a music 
listener’s mistaken belief that a “cover” is the original version of a song.227 
Therefore any “market help” to Cariou would be slim, because as the Second 
 
 221.  Fagundes, supra note 211, at 383. 
 222.  714 F.3d 694 at 709 (“Prince’s audience is very different from Cariou’s.”). 
 223.  17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698–99 (2013). 
 226.  Vartanian, supra note 1 (tweeting a photo of the exhibition along with the caption 
“Appropriated Exhibit. The only way you’d know my work was a part of this display is . . . well, that’s 
just it, you wouldn’t know. #PrinceofAppropriation.”). 
 227.  See Jordan Runtagh, Cover Me: 20 Famous Songs You Had No Idea Were Covers, VH1 MUSIC, 
(Apr. 18, 2013) http://www.vh1.com/music/tuner/2013-04-18/cover-me-20-famous-songs-you-had-no-
idea-were-covers/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
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Circuit noted, “Prince’s work appeals to an entirely different sort of collector 
than Cariou’s.”228 
If appropriation artists attributed the works they use to their original 
copyright holders, there would likely be more evidence that the use bolstered 
the market for the original. However, Cariou would not have benefitted from 
“market help,” because Prince was not obligated to inform his audience that 
he used Cariou’s photographs. 
Attribution is now being encouraged among younger waves of artists. 
The College Art Association, whose mission is to promote the visual arts and 
their understanding, states that when copying another’s work, an artist 
should cite the source.229 Additionally, artists themselves seek attribution, 
such as Donald Graham whose photograph was used in Richard Prince’s 
recent exhibition.230 Graham clearly wanted his work to be attributed when 
he specifically posted about Prince’s work on social media.231 Other 
organizations that encourage a radical overhaul to our copyright system232 
still encourage attribution to source materials.233 Market help arguments are 
therefore derived from attribution, counter market harm, and lost licensing 
arguments. 
Attribution also plays into analyzing the first factor of fair use, “the 
purpose and character of the use.”234 Without looking to whether the new 
work is a transformation, attribution allows courts to determine whether the 
original art was used in good faith, because “propriety of the defendant’s 
conduct” is relevant to the character of the use.235 Fair use “presupposes 
‘good faith and fair dealing,’”236 and when the defendant’s conduct has been 
 
 228.  Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709. 
 229.  Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for the Visual Arts, COLLEGE ART ASSOCIATION 11, (Feb. 
2015), www.collegart.org/pdf/fair-use/best-practices-fair-use-visual-arts.pdf. 
 230.  Vartanian, supra note 1. Donald Graham’s Rastafarian Smoking a Joint, Jamaica was uploaded 
to Instagram by a third party and Prince used the photo in his New Portraits exhibit without permission 
or attributing Graham. Id. 
 231.  Id. (posting on Donald Graham’s Instagram account saying “How to credit a work: ‘Rastafarian 
Smoking a Joint’ © 1997 Donald Graham”). 
 232.  QUESTIONCOPYRIGHT.ORG, http://questioncopyright.org/about (last visited Mar. 28, 2015) 
(stating that QuestionCopyright.org’s mission is “to provide advocacy and practical education to help 
cultural producers embrace open distribution”). 
 233.  QUESTIONCOPYRIGHT.ORG, http://questioncopyright.org/minute_memes. The organization 
created a series of videos called “minute memes,” which address and question certain aspects of current 
copyright law. Id. One of the videos, entitled “Credit is Due (The Attribution Song),” encourages artists 
to always attribute the original author when using their work. Id. 
 234.  17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 235.  4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §  13.05[A][1][d], n.121 
(Matthew Bender, ed.) (string-citing cases stating this principle). 
 236.  Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (quoting Schulman, 
Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright Act, 53 IOWA L. REV. 832 (1968)). 
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found to be in bad faith, it tips the scales of the first factor in favor of a non-
fair use.237 Attribution to the original author provides additional evidence that 
the appropriation artist acts in good faith. Weighed with the other factors in 
light of the purpose of copyright, attribution could be beneficial under both 
the first and the fourth fair use factors.238 
A reversion to the fourth factor as being usually “the most important”239 
will prevent judges from interpreting art with their own subjective views. It 
will also allow appropriation artists to argue “market help” within a fair use 
analysis. The fair use test should heavily stress the fourth factor, so that 
courts can consider the net effects of an allegedly infringing use on markets 
for the original work. The fourth factor should also be heavily stressed so 
that appropriation artists can support a fair use defense while judges leave 
their personal views on art in their chambers. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Courts have continued to expand the fair use doctrine ever since 
Campbell used the transformation test as a nearly dispositive fair use 
analysis. The transformative test requires judges to find meanings in works 
of art by comparing them side-by-side, applying their own views, and 
making determinations with little-to-no fine arts experience.  Conversely, the 
statutory factors, which do not mention transformation, are weighed in light 
of each other. An emphasis on the statutory list does not require judges to 
make subjective, uninformed decisions. Additionally, attribution to 
copyrighted works provides for a good faith defense against a market harm 
argument under the fourth factor of fair use by rebutting any market harm 
arguments with a market help argument. The Supreme Court should no 
longer require an examination of whether the new work is a transformation 
in appropriation art cases.  Instead, it should provide guidance to the lower 
courts about how to objectively and effectively apply the four statutory 
factors. 
There is no statutory requirement for appropriation artists to give 
attribution. Requiring one would impose a burden to make a formal 
 
 237.  See Harper & Row, Publishers. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (“The Nation 
knowingly exploited a purloined manuscript . . . [u]nlike the typical claim for fair use, The Nation cannot 
offer up even the fiction of consent as justification.”). Cf. Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 
18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[G]ood faith also weighs in . . . favor [of the first] prong of the fair use test. . . . 
Although acknowledgement does not excuse infringement, the failure to acknowledge counts against the 
infringer.”). 
 238.  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 239.  See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, LLC, 766 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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requirement. However, Congress could amend the statute to encourage 
artists to give attribution by allowing market help arguments when there has 
been attribution, and not assigning significant weight to those arguments 
when there has been none. Focusing on the fourth factor will allow plaintiffs 
to bring infringement actions without fearing what a judge will think of the 
artworks in question, and allow appropriation artists to have more 
compelling arguments when considering overall market effect. 
  


